The Specifiers (Al-Mukhassasāt) in Islamic Jurisprudence (Uṣūl al-Fiqh): A Comparative Study Between the Majority (Jumhūr) and the Ḥanafī School

Abstract

The concept of Al-Mukhassasāt (Specifiers) involves evidence that restricts a general text (‘Āmm) to apply only to some of its referents. This is a central discussion in Islamic jurisprudence (Uṣūl al-Fiqh). Jurists disagree on their classification: the Jumhūr (Majority) recognize both connected (Mutaṣṣil) specifiers (like conditions, exceptions, or limits within the text) and separate (Munfaṣil) specifiers (like independent texts, reason, or custom). The Ḥanafīs, however, are stricter, requiring an initial specifier to be independent and contemporaneous with the general text. They view non-independent elements (like exceptions) as inherent textual limitations, not true specifiers. A key distinction is the use of a solitary tradition (Khabar al-Wāḥid) to restrict the Qur'ān: the Jumhūr generally allow this specification, but the Ḥanafīs only permit it if the Qur’ānic text was already restricted by a prior, definitive proof. This difference has practical legal implications, such as the ruling on the necessity of reciting Sūrat al-Fātiḥah in prayer.

Furthermore, specification is fundamentally different from Abrogation (Naskh): specification restricts the ruling from the outset (the excluded cases were never intended), while abrogation removes a ruling after it was initially established and is always subsequent. Finally, the foundational maxim guiding the interpretation of these texts is: "Consideration is given to the generality of the wording, not the specificity of the cause," meaning the general wording applies broadly regardless of the specific incident that prompted its revelation.